Institutional on chain lending on Maple. This is the book we publish cover against, read live from the chain.
Cover pays on real economic loss only, a borrower default, a collateral shortfall, or a liquidation that gaps. A hack or exploit of the protocol's own contracts is not a covered loss. Two tokens trade on an AMM, MAPLE-S for buyers and MAPLE-L for sellers. The market sets the price, we read the loss and settle.
What cover costs and what the long side earns
Average the loan rates, subtract the SOFR rate, and the spread left over is what this lending pays for the risk it carries. That spread is the benchmark, not the cover price. The cover is priced by the market on the AMM, by supply and demand, and it trades around the benchmark, below it when the market sees less risk than the loan pays, above it in negative carry when it sees more. A cover seller posts real capital, holds MAPLE-L, and earns the live premium on top of the SOFR base rate their funded collateral earns in tokenized T bills, so the sell side yield sits near 6 percent today. We read the loss and publish the benchmark, we set no price.
A coupon at or below the risk free rate is a subsidy, not a credit spread, so those loans are screened out before this is computed. 6 were excluded, about $367.7M, listed below. The 216 bps is the arm's length benchmark spread, not a blend with zero coupon teasers. The sell side is fully funded, no leverage and no liquidation, the collateral is posted up front.
What qualifies it to be covered
These checks decide whether a book qualifies to have cover published against it. We show the ones it fails too, because the gaps are the risk a buyer is taking cover on.
What is in the covered book
The loans cover is published against. Every Maple loan above the $10.0M floor that pays a real credit spread, 30 in all, value weighted by size, so the largest name is 14.5 percent of the book and a big low rate loan counts more than a small high rate one. Wallets are real but not yet mapped to names, so each shows its on chain reference.
| # | Loan | Outstanding | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0x7f11…5fd6 | $200.0M | 6.10% |
| 2 | 0xe37a…e218 | $175.0M | 4.00% |
| 3 | 0xa836…f9aa | $145.0M | 6.00% |
| 4 | 0x3b74…f7dd | $110.0M | 6.15% |
| 5 | 0x080f…2a33 | $75.0M | 5.75% |
| 6 | 0x1384…5772 | $62.2M | 7.75% |
| 7 | 0x0d2d…2b9a | $62.1M | 7.50% |
| 8 | 0x2793…fbde | $60.0M | 4.10% |
| 9 | 0xd244…31b9 | $50.0M | 5.50% |
| 10 | 0x2ae1…8c2d | $50.0M | 5.35% |
| 11 | 0x0d7c…7733 | $46.9M | 7.75% |
| 12 | 0x7669…e9a5 | $30.0M | 5.90% |
| 13 | 0x4ebd…f3de | $30.0M | 6.00% |
| 14 | 0x3ac7…3043 | $25.0M | 5.75% |
| 15 | 0x7713…5c61 | $25.0M | 6.00% |
| 16 | 0x3b44…c7e7 | $25.0M | 5.50% |
| 17 | 0x3414…ded8 | $25.0M | 6.25% |
| 18 | 0xe2dd…f080 | $22.0M | 4.75% |
| 19 | 0x508a…bc02 | $21.3M | 5.75% |
| 20 | 0xb874…4376 | $20.0M | 5.60% |
| 21 | 0x34ba…0837 | $17.6M | 5.75% |
| 22 | 0xc3a3…2548 | $15.1M | 5.60% |
| 23 | 0xc656…f8e5 | $13.8M | 5.50% |
| 24 | 0x5094…a600 | $12.0M | 5.75% |
| 25 | 0xdede…9c88 | $11.0M | 5.95% |
| 26 | 0x7811…3655 | $10.0M | 5.95% |
| 27 | 0x8047…2d35 | $10.0M | 5.00% |
| 28 | 0x60fa…bc33 | $10.0M | 8.25% |
| 29 | 0x6fd5…29a7 | $10.0M | 5.60% |
| 30 | 0x0d48…1619 | $10.0M | 5.50% |
A coupon at or below 3.63 percent is a subsidy, not a credit spread, so these are excluded by rule, not hidden. They carry real default risk but no income, which is why they do not belong in a credit index.
The loss this cover addresses
This is the kind of loss cover pays on, the defaults, collateral shortfalls, and liquidation gaps that leave lenders short, read from the chain. Maple lost real money in the 2022 cluster, then overhauled its underwriting and tightened terms, and has not taken a loss since. The history is here so a clean present is not read as a clean past, and so a buyer can see what a payout would have addressed.
| Borrower | Loss | When | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| M11 Credit pool | $10.0M | 2022-07 | on chain |
| Orthogonal Trading | $36.0M | 2022-12 | CoinDesk |
| Babel Finance | $7.9M | 2022-06 | public reporting |
The $53.9M of 2022 losses were 2 to 3 borrowers at near total loss. Equal weighting makes each name 3.33 percent of the book, so a payout against the whole book settles at 6.7 to 10.0 percent. The pools that actually held those loans lost far more, because they were concentrated in them. A buyer who held MAPLE-S on the book would have had the loss read from the chain and the payout settled against the MAPLE-L holders who posted the capital.